Many developing countries would like to increase the share of modern or formal sectors in their employment. One way to accomplish this goal may be to encourage the entrance of foreign firms. They are typically relatively large, with high productivity and good access to foreign markets, and might therefore be better at creating jobs than domestic firms are. However, previous research on the issue has been limited by the paucity of long data sets for firm operations.
Introduction
One of the possible consequences of inward foreign direct investments (FDI) for developing countries, and one that is of particular interest to their governments, is the extent to which the investment creates new jobs in the industrial, or "modern" sector, to help in the transformation of the economies. Lewis ' (1954) notion of a need to move people out of agriculture and into the modern sector is still a goal for many developing countries (Asian Development Bank, 2005) . There are several ways in which inward FDI might play this role.
There is considerable evidence that foreign-owned firms are relatively efficient, and may for that reason have access to foreign markets that would not be within the reach of domestically-owned firms. They may also have wider contacts and knowledge of world markets and better access to financing, all advantages that should provide a positive effect on their employment.
1 On the other side, the foreign-owned firms may compete with domestically-owned firms for some markets, so that the losses of employment by domestically-owned firms may offset, to some extent, the gains in the foreign-owned firms. In addition, the foreign-owned firms may tend to be more capitalintensive than domestically-owned firms, and more intensive in the use of imported intermediate products, so that an increase in their sales adds less to employment than would a corresponding increase by domestically-owned firms.
In this paper, we use Indonesian manufacturing plant level data between 1975 and 2005 to analyze the effect of FDI on employment. We first compare rates of employment growth in foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants. Second, we examine employment growth after foreign acquisitions of domestically-owned establishment and domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned establishments. These observations hold constant the identity of the individual establishment, although not its characteristics. If foreign ownership provides superior technology or better access to world markets, establishments should tend to raise their employment after foreign takeovers. If these advantages require continued foreign ownership, there may be employment losses when a foreign-owned establishment is acquired by a domestic firm. On the other hand, if the technological or other gains from foreign ownership are retained in the establishment, its level and growth of employment may continue after a domestic acquisition.
Acquisitions may not be random with respect to the prospects for the target establishment. In order to control for unobservable firm characteristics that could involve selection bias in foreign acquisitions, we combine propensity score matching techniques with the more general difference in differences estimator. To test whether any effects are due to changes between foreign and domestic ownership, we examine both domesticallyowned establishments that are acquired by foreign owners and foreign-owned establishments that are acquired by domestic owners.
Foreign plants in Indonesian manufacturing
We analyze Indonesian manufacturing data supplied by the Indonesian Statistical These different sources of growth of employment in foreign owned plants are shown in Table 2 . Up through 1989, foreign takeovers accounted for a large part of total growth in employment in foreign-owned manufacturing establishments, but they were offset by declines in such employment from local takeovers of foreign-owned plants.
After 1989, the foreign takeovers added more to the foreign-owned share than the domestic takeovers took away.
The path of takeover activity between foreign and domestic owners, in terms of numbers of takeovers, is described by Figure 2 . The numbers of takeovers had been 6 fairly similar in the two directions until the 1990s, but since then, foreign takeovers have been more numerous, except in 1997, during the Asian crisis. However, the net effect of foreign and domestic takeovers was less important as a source of employment growth in foreign-owned establishments than the combination of the establishment of new foreignowned plants and their more rapid growth.
Econometric approach
We begin the econometric analysis by treating growth in employment as a function of various plant characteristics:
where i indexes firms, and t indexes year.
The variables included in the model are:
L:
Employment. Dummy variables for year, industry (two-digit ISIC), and region (provinces aggregated into 5 regions).
Plant
The plant control variables might be endogenously determined and we try to control for this possibility by lagging them one period. Hence, we assume that growth in employment between period t and t+1 is caused by, for instance, the size in period t.
Labor productivity, as measured by value-added per employee, was included in some experiments, but it added nothing to the equation and was dropped.
Ownership is divided into foreign, government-domestic and private-domestic. Acquisitions may not be random with respect to factors that determine future growth. This means that estimates on employment growth may be biased if nonrandomness is not taken into account. We therefore use propensity score matching (PSM) combined with the more general difference-in-differences technique, as suggested by e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2005) , Heyman et al. (2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009 The probability of takeover, the propensity score, is obtained by fitting a probit model. The model specification is similar to the OLS regressions above but adds variables such as plant age and log productivity, lagged one year. Table A1 shows that young and large domestically-owned plants with high productivity and energy intensity are relatively likely to be acquired by foreign owners. By contrast, foreign-owned plants that are small, with low productivity and energy intensity, are relatively likely to be taken over by domestic owners. Hence, foreigners acquire what seem to be relatively good domestic plants (cherry picking) and domestic actors acquire relatively poor foreign owned plants. By constructing a matched sample based on the probability of takeover, the selection problem is reduced.
We employ a nearest neighbor matching technique with replacement to construct our matched sample of plants. In case of foreign takeover, each domestic plant that would be acquired later by foreign owners is matched to an always domestic plant that has the closest propensity score. The same approach is used for domestic takeovers. Moreover, the matched treated and control units are from the same year and same industry.
Of the 1,037 foreign takeovers, 390 are in the treatment group. The loss in the number of foreign takeovers from the treatment group is mainly due to the fact that there are 475 foreign takeovers reported to have taken place in the second year after the plant starts operation, and thus there is no employment growth in the pre-acquisition period to compare with. Another 108 takeovers are dropped because there are some missing values in the observed characteristics used to estimate propensity scores. Of 652 domestic takeovers, 291 are included in the treatment group. 233 domestic takeovers are dropped because they are reported to have taken place in the second year of operation, and another 128 domestic takeovers are dropped because of missing values. It is a cause for concern that so many takeovers are dropped because they are reported to take place in the second year of existence. However, the regression analyses were carried out on samples with and without takeover in the second year, and the results were robust.
Tests are conducted to make sure that our matched sample is balanced in the sense that the treated and control units have similar pre takeover values on the control variables (Tables A2 and A3 ). In the matched sample, the differences in means of the control variables are not significant between treated and control units.
Having obtained a control group of firms, we combine propensity score matching with the difference-in-differences estimator to estimate the impact of acquisitions on employment. The difference-in-differences approach compares employment growth for the treated group of acquired plants with the relevant control group of plants that are not acquired.
L is employment growth rates (difference in log employment) or, in some estimations, employment itself. Post refers to the post-acquisition period, which could be in the year of acquisition, or one year after, or the average of the whole post-acquisition periods. Pre refers to the period before acquisition. Similarly it could be one year before the acquisition, or the average of the all the years before acquisition. The difference in the second parenthesis corrects the selection bias in the pre-acquisition period.
Econometric results

Determinants of the rate of plant employment growth
We start in Table 3 with simple OLS analyses on the whole universe of manufacturing plants. The equations include the ownership variables, Foreign and Government, and the reference group is therefore domestic-private firms. The coefficient for Foreign is positive and statistically significant, indicating a rate of growth in employment 6 percent higher in foreign-owned than in domestic-private plants. The coefficient for government is statistically significant, but only 2 percent.
The equation includes plant characteristics that might affect employment growth.
Large firms have comparatively low growth rates, as has been found in previous studies (e.g. Karlsson et al., 2008) . Plants that are more energy intensive and use more raw materials are associated with higher employment growth rates in general.
The last two columns examine growth of the numbers of blue-and white-collar workers. The positive effect on the employment of blue-collar workers is substantially larger than the effect on white-collar workers: 6 percent compared to 3.6 percent. The effect of government ownership is also higher for blue-than for white-collar workers but both effects are small compared to the effect of foreign ownership. Finally, the negative effect of size and the positive effect of input per employee on employment growth primarily affect blue-collar workers, as is also the case for the positive effect from energy intensity.
The evidence of Table 3 is that foreign-owned plants tend to increase their employment 6 percent faster than private domestically-owned plants over the years of their existence, given the other characteristics of the plants.
Foreign takeovers and employment growth
In Table 4 , we separate the effects of foreign takeovers from those of foreign ownership in general. The OLS estimate of the effect of foreign ownership aside from foreign acquisition effects is about 5 per cent per year faster growth in employment. The effect of foreign acquisition is subsequent growth in employment at a rate 9 per cent faster than in domestic plants.
The fixed effect approach looks at growth in employment within a firm before and after the acquisition and removes the time-constant unobserved plant characteristics that could confound the explanation of acquisition effects. Only firms that change ownership are included. Fixed effect estimates raise the foreign acquisition effect to 11 percent. The effect on blue-collar workers is about twice as large as the effect on whitecollar workers. Moreover, the results indicate that domestic acquisition reduces the subsequent rate of employment growth, although only the effect on white-collar workers is statistically significant.
The effect of FDI on employment might differ between trade regimes (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996) . FDI flows drawn to a developing country to take advantage of cheaper labor costs would respond to an export-oriented policy by expansion. By contrast, FDI induced by import substitution policy is limited by the size and income level of the host-country market. 
Matched comparisons of domestic and foreign takeovers
We test these results for possible biases from the selectivity of acquisitions by using propensity score matching. The results are shown in Table 6 . Foreign takeovers raise the growth rate of employment by 10 percent on average during the acquisition and post-acquisition period, after correcting for the pre-acquisition differences between 2 See Aswicahyono et al. (1996; , and Aswicahyono and Hill (2002) for discussions on Indonesia's policy regimes, and for similar distinctions in different periods. While the employment growth rates in foreign takeovers do not differ significantly from those of plants remaining domestically-owned in the first and second years after the takeover, the impact of the foreign takeovers continues, because the acquired plants grow so much in the year of takeover that the same growth rate after takeover implies a considerably larger absolute growth in employment in the following years in the acquired plants, relative to domestic plants, as is shown in Table 7 One implication of this concentration in the year of acquisition is that the usual assumption that "Greenfield" investment adds resources to the recipient country, but acquisitions only change ownership is wrong. Acquisitions can be associated with very substantial additions to resources, quite apart from any gains that might arise from transfers from less-skilled to more-skilled management. The propensity score matching consistently confirmed the advantages of foreign ownership for employment growth. There is also some indication that the employment growth effects of foreign ownership are sensitive to host country trade policy, with liberalization encouraging the expansion of employment through foreign takeover.
Conclusions
There were indications in several tests that there was a decline of employment growth in shifts from foreign to domestic ownership, although that result is not statistically significant.
Most of the employment effects of foreign takeovers took place in the year of takeover. There was relatively little effect on growth rates in the following years, but the absolute additions to employment in the years after takeover were larger than they would have been under continued local ownership because the base was much larger.
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